This is another special edition of our Iran Monitor Report, again focusing on the recent political developments in Iraq. This report is still fully free to access. Iraq continues to be a critical area in the MENA region, especially as the U.S.-Iran war continues to drive dynamic political shifts, and GIG will ensure that our readers are fully informed on major developments.
Executive Summary
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has set 30 September 2026 as a final deadline to confine all weapons to state control, timed to coincide with the International Coalition's withdrawal from the country. The policy pairs Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law prosecution with a 35,000-job reintegration incentive, and carries backing from the State Administration Coalition and judiciary chief Faiq Zaidan.
Factional split. Saraya al-Salam, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Imam Ali have agreed to disband their independent brigades and place their weapons under direct state command. Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada reject the deadline outright and are expanding their arsenals. The State of Law and Badr leadership are pushing for postponement to avoid intra-Shia rupture. Recent flashpoints, a Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) arrest of a Harakat al-Nujaba intelligence official and drone strikes on Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) figures in Erbil, show how quickly enforcement can escalate.
The Kadhimi precedent. Al-Zaidi's 2026 position is structurally stronger than Mustafa al-Kadhimi's in 2021: a real parliamentary majority, firmer judicial backing, greater Shia political cohesion, and a fixed coalition exit date. But the underlying risk is the same. Former Prime Minister al-Kadhimi's 2021 arrest of Qasim Muslih triggered a factional siege and, months later, a drone assassination attempt on his residence. Any CTS move against faction leadership today risks the same deterrence playbook.
Three scenarios.
- Direct confrontation. Full coercive enforcement risks a 2021-style siege and personal danger to al-Zaidi.
- Political settlement. Postponing the deadline protects al-Zaidi but erodes his credibility and leaves militias armed.
- Partial enforcement. Integrating compliant factions while isolating and legally targeting holdouts under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.
Assessment. Scenario 3 is the most viable path. It leverages al-Zaidi's structural advantages without forcing an all-or-nothing clash, but requires sustained judicial support and high-readiness security to manage the residual risk of retaliation from isolated hardline factions.
Download the full report
This report below is fully free-to-access, and goes into extensive detail about the recent political-security tensions in the country while breaking down each scenario in full.
This report was developed in partnership with Karam Hussein, a Security Risk Management Advisor and Analyst specializing in Iraqi affairs, with over nine years of experience operating in high-risk environments.
Hussein examines the geopolitical and security landscape of Iraq, with a particular focus on conflict dynamics, armed actors, and their implications for national and regional stability.
He has a Master’s degree in Conflict, Peace and Security from the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya.